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ernment. To add to the problem, the Union has countersuited for
$1,000,000. It is easy to imagine similar suits in the Philadelphia area
if one of the contractors loses a Government contract because he has
not met his good faith obligation. Any suit such as this must create
friction between management and labor and especially so in a sit-
uation such as exists in Kansas City where a construction industry
strike has already lasted more than five months. 25 It would seem
that the Government could promote racial equality by other means
which would be less conducive to labor-management strife:,
One such method which would promote racial equality and which
should not promote labor-management strife is indicated by the case
of United States v. Sheet Metal Wkrs. Int. Ass'n., Local 36.26 That
case seems to recognize that it is better to direct racial equality ef-
forts against the unions rather than the contractors. In Sheet Metal
Wkrs., the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ordered the union
to undertake a public information program to show Negroes that they
now have equal opportunities for union membership. 27 That action
was undertaken by the United States Attorney General for the benefit
of local minority groups. There is nothing in the digests28 to indicate
that any such action has been undertaken in the Philadelphia area.
It is hard to understand how the Court in the instant case can say
that the Philadelphia Plan is not arbitrary and capricious when there
is a much more reasonable and efficacious method available as in-
dicated by the Sheet Metal Wkrs. case.
It is not contested that the Government has the right and the duty
to see that minority groups are properly represented in contracts
involving federal money. It should be proper, however, to contest the
methods which they have chosen to carry this out. It is suggested that
applying pressure on the contractors rather than the unions is merely
giving lip service to the intended goal.
MERVIN D. NORDENG
CRIMINAL LAW-SALE OF MARIJUANA-LIABILITY OF AGENTS-
Appellant was arrested and tried for the sale of marijuana to
Gregory Waxler, whom appellant claimed was his partner in the pur-
chase of the marijuana., On the evidence presented by Waxler, the
25. Kansas City Star, Sept. 9, 1970, at 2A, col. 3.
26. United States v. Sheet Metal Wkrs. Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
27. Id. at 140.
28. 5 WEST DECENNLAL DIGEST Civi Ribhts §§ 2-3 (7th ed. and 1967-1970 Supp.).
1. A reading of the trial transcript seems to sustain appellant's contention that
Waxier was his partner.
[cross-examination of Gregory Waxler by Mr. Murphy]
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appellant was found guilty of the sale of marijuana, a crime punish-
able by a fine of two thousand dollars or two years in prison or both.
* A motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict of the jury was
contrary to law and clearly against the evidence was denied by the
district court and appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of North
Dakota, alleging that there was no sale of marijuana as described in
the North Dakota Century Code.- The Court held that "sale," as
used in connection with narcotics statutes, is broader in meaning
than when used in connection with other statutes and the judgment
of conviction was affirmed. State v. Dwyer, 172 N.W. 2d 591 (N.D.
1969).
The definition of "sale" as used in the North Dakota Century
Code is taken verbatim from the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act.
Sale-includes barter, exchange, or gift, or offer therefore,
and each such transaction made by any person, whether as
principal, proprietor, agent, servant or employee.4
The Court focused on the question of whether the transfer of mari-
juana between an agent and his principal constituted a sale under
the North Dakota statute. In holding that a "sale" did take place the
court followed the lead of the Superior Court of New Jersey5 and
adopted the language of the Supreme Court of Illinois.
We interpret the meaning of the word 'sale' as defined by
the act, to be much broader than that usually given to it in
other branches of the law.e
The construction of the term "sale" so as not to include the
agent of the purchaser as seller originally comes from federal de-
cisions that form the basis for later state decisions. The earliest was
United States v. Sawyer,7 where it was pointed out that the dis-
Q. "And did you say at that time-would it be safe to say you
decided between the two of you to purchase and sell marijuana?"
A. "Yes"
Q. "And as an outgrowth of that agreement would you say then that
you and the defendent did purchase the very marijuana we are talking
about today?"
A. "I think so."
(recross-examination]
Q. "Let me ask you this: This money you allegedly paid to the de-
fendent, Richard Dwyer, that was part of an agreement that you and he
had, would it be safe to say, this is part of your payment towards the
purchase of this marijuana?"
A. "What?"
Q. "That this was part of the agreement between you and Richard
Dwyer-would it be safe to say that this money was part of your share of
the general scheme and plan to purchase marijuana and resell it?"
A. "Yes, I think you could say that."
2. N.D. CENT CODE § 19-03-28.1 (1969 Supp.).
3. N.D. CENT CODE § 19-03-01(9) (1960).
4. UNIORM NARcoTc DRUG LAw § 1(10), 9 B.U.L.A. (1966).
5. State v. Weissmen, 73 N.J.Super. 274, 179 A.2d 748 (1962).
6. People v. Shannon, 15 Il.2d 494, 155 N.E.2d 580 (1959).
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tinction between a seller and a purchasing agent is obvious to a law-
yer and thus because defendent was acting for the buyer and not
seller, he could not be convicted under an indictment for the crime
of sale. The Sawyer decision was reaffirmed in United States v.
Moses,8 in which the court stated that the United States Code9
treats selling and buying as separate offenses, and limits the offenses
to selling and buying, setting up no general offense of participation
in the transaction viewed as a whole.
The New York courts have followed the approach taken by the
federal courts. They have stated that an agent of a purchaser can-
not be convicted of selling narcotics to his principal0 since he re-
ceives no consideration." The New York statute is similar to North
Dakota's, except that it could be construed broader as it includes the
word "gives" as one of the punishable acts under the statute. 22 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has expressly stated that
they will not follow the doctrine set up by the Illinois court in the
Shannon case, but will follow the New York approach. The Massa-
chusetts court focused on the facts that the defendent had no finan-
cial interest in the transaction, nor was employed by the seller to
promote sales.13 The defendant in the Massachusetts case was tried
under a Massachusetts statute' 4 which is exactly the same as the
North Dakota statute. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, while
searching for an interpretation of the term "sale" as described in the
drug laws of Texas, 15 chose to accept the decisions of the New York
courts~and reject those of Illinois, and thus held that the agent of the
purchaser is not guilty of making a sale as the agent was in no way
associated with the seller and received no financial profit. 6
The Illinois and the New Jersey cases relied on by the North
Dakota Supreme Court are distinguishable from the factual situation
presented in the instant case. In the Shannon case the defendant re-
ceived consideration for getting drugs for the purchaser. Appellant
did not. The money received by appellant was Waxler's share of the
cost of the marijuana. Appellant made no profit from the transfer
of the marijuana, but the defendant in the Shannon case did. The
Illinois court stated that they believed that any person who took part
in such transaction was guilty of the crime of sale. 7 The question
7. United States v. Sawyer, 201 F.2d 169 (3rd Cir. 1953).
8. United States v. Moses, 220 F.2d 168 (3rd Cir. 1955).
9. 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 2553-54 (1967).
10. People v. Pulliam, 28 App.Div.2d 786, 281 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1967).
11. People v. Lindsey, 16 App.Div.2d 805, 228 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962) affd. 12 N.Y.2d
958, 238 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1962).
12. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1751 (McKinney 1967). "Any person who shall barter or ex-
change with or sell, give or offer to give another any narcotic drug." (emphasis added).
13. Commonwealth v. Harvard, 69 A.S. 1341, 253 N.E.2d 349 (1969).
14. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANNO. ch. 94, § 197 (1958).
15. TEXAS PENAL LAW art. 725b, § 1(10) (Vernon's Anno. P.C.) (1961).
16. Smith v. State, 396 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. 1965).
17. People v. Shannon, 15 1l1.2d 494, 155 N.E.2d 580 (1955).
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should have been asked of the Illinois court why the Illinois legis-
lature made a crime of possession 8 if the legislature meant the
crime of sale to be all encompassing. In the Weissmen case, the
transaction that the New Jersey court held to be a sale was between
the defendant who sold the marijuana to the alleged agent who in
turn sold it to the ultimate purchaser. This situation would be better
likened to a wholesaler-retailer relationship rather than one between
a principal and an agent. The alleged agent bought for three dollars
and sold for five, thus receiving consideration for the transfer. 9
It seems that the court was wrong in holding that this agency
relationship gave rise to a sale. There are several questions that
should be asked by every court when dealing with the agency situ-
ation in relation to sales. Did consideration pass from the principal
to the agent for the purpose of a payment to the agent, or was the
consideration merely to be delivered by the agent to the seller? A
good test might be to look at any profit the agent might make by the
transfer of the marijuana from himself to the buyer. Was there a
transaction between the agent and the purchaser? Was the agent act-
ing as an agent of the seller in a common scheme or plan? The court
should look at who put the agent into motion, under whose orders
was he working, and who employed him.
The real aim of the statute is to throw aside the defense of any
"principal, proprietor, agent, servant, or employee" who seeks to
insulate himself by imposing another between himself and the sale.
It is aimed at the dispensor of marijuana, not the procurer.
The act of transfer of the marijuana from appellant to his part-
ner does not fit any of the definitions given in the North Dakota
statute. It is not a sale, 20 barter, 2 exchange, 22 gift,23 or offer there-
fore. Appellant held the marijuana in trust for his fellow purchaser
and thus the only act that took place between the two was a transfer
of possession. The agent is like the arm of the principal. An arm does
not sell food to the body, and neither does an agent sell marijuana to
his principal. The principal cannot buy what he already owns.
The definition of "sale" has been broadened by the inclusion of
the words barter, exchange, gift, or offer therefore within it. This
writer does not believe that average men would consider these trans-
actions a sale, so why should the court introduce the relationship be-
tween an agent and a principal as another element of sale and add
still more confusion? It is for the state legislature to decree whether
or not certain acts are to be criminal, not the courts.
18. ILL. CRIM. LAW AND PROC. ch. 38 § 22-3 (Smith-Hurd Ill. Anno. Stat. 1970).
19. State v. Weissmen, 73 N.J.Super. 274, 179 A.2d 750 (1962).
20. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1503 (rev. 4th Ed. 1968).
21. Id. at 191.
22. Id. at 671.
23. Id. at 817.
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The Federal Courts have now found a method of including agents
of the purchaser within the punishable class.2 4 The agent is now
held for facilitating the sale, but not for the sale itself. This is based
on a federal statute which expressly lists facilitation as a crime. 25
The courts of North Dakota should be patient and wait for our leg-
islature to do the same before they punish one who does something
"bad" but not punishable under the present laws.
MARK THOMASON
24. Lowis v. United States, 337 P.2d 541, (D.C. Cir. 1964).
25. 21 U.S.C. § 174 "1O]r receives, conetv:ts, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates
the transportation, concealment or sale," (ei phasL added).
